




Contagion and Firms’ Internationalization in Latin America: 
 












We investigate whether contagion matters when emerging market firms cross-list their 
stocks in a developed capital market. We develop a rational expectations model where 
financial markets are segmented along emerging markets’ borders and contagion spreads 
from one emerging market to another through the actions of international investors 
rebalancing their portfolio using stocks cross-listed in the developed market. We find that 
contagion is a cost of internationalization as cross-listed stocks are more affected by 
contagion than pure domestic stocks. Furthermore, a welfare analysis of international 
cross-listing versus financial autarky suggests that the benefits of internationalization in 
terms of less information asymmetry and better market efficiency offset the costs of 
contagion. The model is able to explain some transmission of the 1998 Brazilian crisis to 
Mexico and Chile. 
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The paper analyzes whether ﬁnancial contagion aﬀects diﬀerently international
stocks in contrast to pure domestic stocks when there is an emerging market
crisis, all other stock characteristics being controlled for. We deﬁne contagion as
the transmission of a shock in one country to the stock price in another country.
We deﬁn ei n t e r n a t i o n a ls t o c k sa se m e r g i n gm a r k e ts t o c k st h a ta r el i s t e di nb o t h
their local market and an international capital market through cross-listing, and
pure domestic stocks as stocks only traded in their domestic market.
We develop a rational expectations model that provides a measure of the cost
of contagion when emerging market ﬁrms cross-list their stocks in a common
developed market exchange. In that context, contagion occurs through the
action of investors buying and selling cross-listed stocks when they are faced with
a liquidity, information, or country speciﬁc shock. In that purpose, our model
makes the distinction between emerging markets and developed markets; and, in
each market, between international stocks and pure domestic stocks. We depart
from the common assumption that all ﬁnancial markets are perfectly integrated.
Instead, we argue that markets are segmented along emerging markets’ borders.
Speciﬁcally, emerging market investors mostly invest in their domestic market,
whereas developed market investors aka international investors invest in the
cross-listed stocks.
As an application, we calibrate our model using a unique dataset of cross-
listed stocks and pure domestic stocks in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The cal-
ibration exercise allows us to investigate whether our model can explain the
transmission of the 1998 Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile through the action
of international investors buying and selling stocks cross-listed in the U.S. And
in that context, the model reveals what type of shocks were mostly transmitted.
Finally, we assess whether the beneﬁts of internationalization oﬀset the
costs of contagion in our model by performing a welfare-comparison of ﬁnancial
cross-listing versus ﬁnancial autarky for all investors.
We ﬁnd that international cross-listing is costly because of contagion: the
price response in one emerging country to a shock in another emerging country
is signiﬁcantly stronger for cross-listed stocks than for pure domestic stocks,
all other characteristics being controlled for. However, we ﬁnd a magnitude of
contagion that is smaller than reported in other models of contagion that as-
sume perfectly integrated ﬁnancial markets, which suggests that the magnitude
of contagion may have been overestimated in previous studies. Furthermore,
shocks in one emerging market are transmitted to all the emerging markets
2that have cross-listed stocks in the same developed market even if the emerging
markets do not share common economic factors.
The calibration exercise suggests that our model can explain the transmis-
sion of the Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile through the action of interna-
tional investors rebalancing stocks cross-listed in the U.S. We ﬁnd that negative
liquidity and country speciﬁc shocks were the most important determinants of
contagion.
The welfare analysis of international cross-listing versus ﬁnancial autarky
suggests that investors are better oﬀ internationally cross-listing their stock
versus autarky. Indeed, the beneﬁts of internationalization in terms of reduced
information asymmetry and improved market eﬃciency in all the markets (as
highlighted in the literature) oﬀset the costs of contagion in terms of an increase
in volatility and a drop in stock prices.
Overall, the ﬁndings of the paper conﬁrm that internationalization increases
ﬁrms’ exposure to contagion. And international investors play a role in spread-
ing contagion to pure domestic ﬁrms in emerging markets. But most impor-
tantly, the welfare analysis emphasizes that the beneﬁts of internationalization
are greater than the costs of contagion. Our model is able to explain some cases
of contagion and pinpoint which type of shocks were mostly transmitted for the
1998 Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief
literature review of cross-listing and contagion to motivate the model; Section
3 develops the model and interprets contagion within the model and presents
the results, in this section we also perform robustness tests to determine how
results are aﬀected by the choice of parameters; Section 4, the calibrated model
is used to derive the determinants of contagion to Mexico and Chile during the
1998 Brazilian crisis. Section 5 presents, using the model, a welfare analysis
of ﬁnancial internationalization through cross-listings versus ﬁnancial autarky;
Section 6 concludes and suggests policy implications and avenues for future
research.
2 Literature Review
International cross-listing boomed in the last decade as a mechanism to circum-
vent market segmentation in emerging markets and to allow emerging market
ﬁrms to access international capital markets. Indeed, internationalization en-
ables emerging market ﬁrms to raise capital at a lower cost and to increase their
shareholder base. In the same vein,internationalization allows investors in devel-
oped countries to achieve emerging market’s diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and higher
returns right at home1. Indeed, investment barriers through taxes, ownership
1For instance, in 2002, there were 470 foreign listings in the New York Stock Exchange,
and their market capitalization represented 30% of the total exchange.
3restrictions, and information asymmetry create market segmentation in emerg-
ing markets. This segmentation is reﬂected in the existence of a price premium
between shares accessible to foreign investors and shares restricted to local in-
vestors. Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1999) show evidence of signiﬁcant
price premia for unrestricted stocks from Mexico, reﬂecting market segmenta-
tion due to foreign ownership restrictions. Thus, international investors have
reduced incentives to directly invest in a domestic market. In that context, inter-
nationalization through cross-listing becomes a mechanism for emerging market
ﬁrms to circumvent market segmentation and access global securities markets.
The literature on cross-listing provides mixed results on whether interna-
tionalization (cross-listing) is beneﬁcial or detrimental to the development of
the domestic market. Alexander and al (1987) show that cross-listing produces
an externality eﬀect by indirectly integrating the market for pure domestic se-
curities with the foreign market. Levine and Schmukler (2002) show that cross-
listings result in a drop of liquidity in the domestic market. Hargis (2002)
investigates diﬀerent types of liberalizations including direct listing of securities
in U.S. exchanges, and ﬁnds that volatility decreases in Latin America after
liberalization. Karolyi (2003) claims that the growth of ADRs neither facili-
tate nor hinders the development of the local stock market. Domowitz et al
(1998) highlight that the ultimate eﬀect on the local market depends on the
inter-market transparency.
The literature on contagion provides some insight on why internationaliza-
tion may spread contagion to emerging markets, however there is little evidence
why international (cross-listed) ﬁrms should be diﬀerently aﬀected by contagion
than purely domestic ﬁrms. International investors, who hold international as-
sets may spread ﬁnancial crises to emerging markets through several channels.
For instance, a crisis in one country may cause investors to revise their ex-
pectations for another country, and sell oﬀ the country’s assets regardless of
fundamentals (Masson (1998)).
In this paper, we consider the portfolio rebalancing channel of contagion,
which advocates that liquidity calls cause some investors to rebalance their
portfolios. International assets being more liquid than pure domestic ones, they
might be liquidated ﬁrst. When information is asymmetric, uninformed market
participants may mistakenly interpret the actions of informed investors as a
signal of low expected returns, liquidate those assets, and trigger contagion
(Calvo and Mendoza (1998), Calvo(1999), and Kodres and Pritsker (2002)).
Indeed, the globalization of capital markets reduces incentives for uninformed
investors to gather costly information and herding proves to be a proﬁtable
strategy which exacerbates contagion (see Calvo and Mendoza (1999)).
Pritsker (2000) shows that negative wealth shocks cause investors with de-
creasing risk aversion to reallocate part of their portfolios towards less risky
assets, thereby spreading contagion to countries in the same region. Allen and
4Gale(2001) show that contagion occurs when banks hold interregional claims
as insurance against liquidity shocks. Actions of banks or non bank ﬁnancial
market participants (mutual funds, hedge funds) may trigger ﬁnancial market
contagion when there is correlated information.
If international investors help spread contagion, we should expect contagion
to aﬀect more international ﬁrms than pure domestic ﬁrms. Boyer, Kumagai and
Yuan (2002) ﬁnd empirical evidence supporting that there is more contagion to
"investable" stocks that are open to foreign investors than to "non-investables".
Similarly, Sakho (2003) ﬁnds empirical evidence that contagion from the 1998
Brazilian crisis aﬀected more international ﬁrms than pure domestic ﬁrms in
Chile and Mexico.
In this paper, we bridge the literatures on international cross-listings and on
contagion to investigate whether international ﬁrms in contrast to pure domestic
ﬁrms are more aﬀected by ﬁnancial contagion when there is a crisis in another
emerging market. To our knowledge the question, of essence for both emerging
and developed markets, has received little attention, if any, in the literature.
Bekaert et al (2002) empirically document the overall eﬀect of contagion on
market integration, however their study focuses on the change in market betas
during crisis period. They do not distinguish between international ﬁrms and
pure domestic ﬁrms.
3 A Rational Expectations Model of Contagion
and Cross-listing
We extend Kodres and Pritsker (2002) in two directions. First, we make the
distinction between developed market and emerging market. In each market,
we distinguish between international stocks, traded in both the local and the
international capital market, and pure domestic stocks, only traded in the local
market. Second, we assume that markets are segmented along emerging markets
borders. That is emerging market investors can only invest in the own stock,
which are either cross-listed stocks and pure domestic stocks2. International-
ization (cross-listing) is in the model the only way for international investors to
buy emerging market stocks and hence diversify and earn higher returns; and
for emerging market investors to access developed capital markets and hence
raise capital at a lower cost and increase their shareholder base.
We assume an early stage of market integration, where ﬁrms from emerging
countries do cross-list some of their assets in the developed market, but ﬁrms
from the developed market do not cross-list their assets in emerging markets.
For the sake of simplicity, we can assume that we have two emerging countries
2Alexander et al (1987) points that emerging market ﬁrms have resorted to cross-listing to
circumvent the negative eﬀects of market segmentation as an investment barrier.
5and a developed country. In each emerging country, we have two assets, an
international asset and a domestic asset. The international asset in emerging
market 1 represents an equally weighted portfolio of all the international assets
in emerging market 1, and the domestic asset represents an equally weighted
portfolio of all pure domestic assets. Indeed, ﬁrms that internationalize are
usually the biggest ﬁrms in terms of market capitalization and value traded.
Hence, by taking equally weighted portfolios, we eliminate size and industry
eﬀects and focus on contagion.
We use the same indices for countries and investors: 0 represents the devel-
oped country, 1 represents emerging country 1, 2 represents emerging country
2. We use the following indices for assets: 0 is only traded in country 0, 01 is
traded in countries 0 and 1, 02 in countries 0 and 2, 1 only in country 1, and 2
only in country 2.
Overall there are ﬁve assets. Let’s deﬁne the 5 by 1 vector of risky assets X
such that
X =[ X0,X 01,X 02,X 1,X 2]
0
We make the following additional assumptions:
A1: Investors have Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences.
A2: Short Sales with use of proceeds are permitted in all countries.
A3: Domestic and Foreign securities returns are joint-normally distributed.
A4: In all countries, there is the same risk free asset with the same gross
rate of return normalized to 1.
A5: All assets are in ﬁxed net supply X.
We assume a two-period endowment economy. Investors trade assets in the
ﬁrst period, and they consume the liquidation values of assets in the second
period. Investors behave competitively, in that they take prices as given.
Let P, V, θ be 5 by 1 vectors such that:
P is the price at which trade takes place at ﬁrst period, V is the random
liquidation value of the asset at second period, and θ represents the information
of informed traders, it is such that
V = θ + U,
where U is a residual uncorrelated to θ.











Informed investors diﬀer from uninformed investors in that informed in-
vestors know θ,( the information shock) whereas uninformed investors do not
know θ. However, uninformed investors can make rational decisions about their
portfolio choices, based on their knowledge of the unconditional distribution of
(θ,U), a n do nt h ep r i c e st h e yo b s e r v ea tﬁrst period P, which reveal some infor-
mation about θ. We assume that informed investors in the developed country
have the same information than informed investors in the emerging country re-
garding the international stock and that informed investors in the two markets
are suﬃciently small not to reveal all their private information at equilibrium.
The number of informed investors in each country is µI,whereas the number of
uninformed investors is µUI.
We assume that investors in each country are identical in terms of risk aver-
sion and ﬁrst period endowment. They all have CARA utility functions with
the same risk tolerance parameter τ, and same ﬁrst period wealth W1.
We also assume that markets are segmented along emerging markets borders,
or that investors can only invest in assets that are traded in their domestic
market. Investors in the developed market can invest into its pure domestic
asset X0, and in the international stocks from emerging country 1 and emerging
country 2, (X01,X 02). In contrast, investors in emerging market i =1 ,2,c a n
only invest in the international asset X0i,a n di nt h ep u r ed o m e s t i ca s s e tXi.
Let’s deﬁne the following matrices Ri selecting the assets that investor i =
































73.1 Investors’ Demand Functions
Informed investor i chooses his positions XI
i in the risky assets X to maximize
his end of period wealth W2, conditional on information, θ.
XI
i is a function of (P,θ), and it is a 5 by 1 vector that solves
Max E (−exp(−W2/τ)|θ)
subject to a budget constraint
W2 = W1 + X0 (V − P)




Let’s deﬁne the ﬁve by ﬁve matrices Ni such that
Ni =[ I5 − Ri(R0
iRi)−1R0
i]
Where I5 represents the 5 by 5 identity matrix.
The optimal choice is
XI
i = τ(Va r(U))−1Ni(θ − P)( 1 )
Similarly, uninformed investors choose their positions XUI in the risky assets
X, to maximize their end of period wealth W2 conditional on prices P.
XUI
i is a function of P, it is a 5 by 1 vector that solves
Max E (−exp(−W2/τ)|P)
subject to subject to a budget constraint
W2 = W1 + X0(V − P)




The optimal choice is
8XUI
i = τVar(V |P)−1Ni(E(V |P) − P)( 2 )
Noise traders sell and buy assets based on their own idiosyncratic need for
liquidity. Let ε be the demand of risky assets by noise traders, ε follows a normal
distribution. It is uncorrelated with the demands of other investors, and with
the fundamental value of the assets.
ε ∼ N (0,Var(ε)) (3)
3.2 Market Clearing Conditions
At equilibrium, the market clearing conditions equate the demand and the sup-
ply of each asset across markets to ﬁnd equilibrium prices. However, because
cross-listed assets are traded in two markets, their demand has two compo-
nents: the demand of the domestic market and the demand from the market
where the asset is cross-listed. The rationality condition for investors requires
an additional condition on the consistency of the beliefs of uninformed investors
about the information revealed by prices at equilibrium. These two conditions
represent the market clearing equations
3.2.1 Market clearing equation
The ﬁxed supply of the asset, represented by the 5 by 1 vector X, is equal to
the sum of the demand of liquidity traders, the demand of all informed investors
and the demand of uninformed investors across the three markets.







In order to get a more concise notation, we can deﬁne the 5 by 5 matrices
A and AV such that




A = Va r(U)
−1 N
AV = Va r(V |P)−1N
The market clearing condition becomes:
X = ε + µIτA(θ − P)+µUIτAV [E(V |P) − P]( 4 )
93.2.2 Consistency Conditions and Expressions of E(V |P) and Va r(V |P)
In the market clearing equation (4), all the terms depending on P can be re-
grouped on the left hand side in a term we call S(P).
S(P)=( µIτA)
−1 X + P − (µIτA)
−1 ∗ µUIτAV [E(V |P) − P]
=( µIτA)
−1 ε + θ (5)
This equation illustrates the fact that in equilibrium, prices do not fully
reveal the information of informed agents. Indeed, they reveal θ, but with a
noise that is function of ε.
We assume that investors are rational, hence their choices at equilibrium re-
ﬂect the information they learn about θ through equation (5).T h i si se q u i v a l e n t
to the following consistency conditions:
E(V |P)=E (V |S(P)) (6)
Va r(V |P)=Va r(V |S(P)) (7)
Using the normality of θ and ε,w ec a ni n f e rt h a tS(P) is also normal, and the
previous equations yield the expressions of E(V |P) and Va r(V |P). See Model
Appendix.
From Equation (6),w ec a nw r i t eE(V |P) as a linear function of θ and ε.
E(V |P)=α1 + α2 ∗ θ + α3 ∗ ε
Where the αi for i =1 ,2,3 are deﬁned in the Model Appendix.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Prices
By rearranging equation (6) we can express prices P as a function of E(V |P)
(which is a linear function of θ, and ε), θ, and ε.
P = M0 + M1E(V |P)+M2θ + M3ε
Then P can be expressed as a function of the shocks θ and ε by replacing
E(V |P) as a function of θ and ε.
P = M0 + M1α1 +( M2 + M1α2)θ +( M3 + M1α3)ε (8)
In equilibrium prices can be expressed as a linear function of information
and liquidity shocks. In the context of our model, this allows us to clearly
see that shocks to any asset in one country have repercussions in the prices of
assets in all the other country. Hence, the decomposition of price as a function
of shocks allows us to deﬁne contagion and provide two methods to actually
measure contagion.
103.3 Contagion: Transmission of Information and Liquidity
Shocks across Markets
In this section, we deﬁne contagion in the context of a baseline case of the model
and we provide two methods of measuring contagion in the model. We adopt
the deﬁnition of contagion as price movements across-markets in excess of what
economic fundamentals would predict. More speciﬁcally, we consider in our
model the channel of contagion that is due to the action of investors rebalanc-
ing their portfolio in the developed country. Indeed, Equation (8) shows that
contagion con occur in the model through three channels: through correlated
liquidity shocks (through ε), through correlated information shocks (through θ),
and ﬁnally through investors cross-market rebalancing. One suﬃcient condition
to exclude contagion through correlated liquidity shocks and correlated infor-
mation shocks is to assume that the covariance matrix of θ, and the covariance
matrix of ε are diagonal. In this case, it is not possible for investors to infer
information on one asset based on informa t i o no na n o t h e ra s s e t .M o r e o v e r ,i ti s
not possible, to predict a liquidity shock for one asset based on liquidity shocks
to another asset. We impose the constraint that the covariance matrices of θ
and ε are diagonal, so that contagion occurs only from investors cross-market
rebalancing.3
3.4 Baseline Model
This part develops a baseline case of the model that considers the extreme case
where the two emerging countries do not share any macroeconomic relations.
However, they have cross-listed assets in the same developed country. We solve
the baseline case for a set of parameters. We show that in the context of our
model, information and liquidity shocks (θ and ε) are transmitted from one
emerging country to the other through the action of investors rebalancing cross-
listed assets in the developed country. In the context of the baseline case of the
model, we deﬁne by contagion the transmission of shocks to assets prices from
one country to another country that do not share economic fundamentals.
There cannot be cross-country transmission of shocks if countries are small
island economies. Technically, in order to generate cross-market rebalancing
in our model, we need to have correlated residual shocks or a non diagonal
covariance matrix for U4. This condition reﬂects the fact that for shocks to be
transmitted across countries, the countries need to be somewhat linked. Hence,
the speciﬁcation of the baseline case of the model consists of decomposing the
3If we assume that the covariance matrices of θ and ε are non diagonal, we allow for two
other channels of contagion : one through correlated information shocks and another through
correlated liquidity shocks. Therefore, we cannot guarantee that the contagion we observe is
only due to the action of investors rebalancing assets cross-listed in the developed exchange.
4We have earlier deﬁned the residuals ui as
vi = θi + ui for i =0 ,01,02,1,2
11residuals Ui in terms of global/regional risk factors and country speciﬁcr i s k
factors. This further ensures that the variance matrix of Ui is non diagonal.
Let fi represent a vector of common risk factors that aﬀect asset values in
more than one country. They can be interpreted as movements in the oil price,
or in the world interest rate.
Let η be a vector of country speciﬁc factors. They can be interpreted as
shocks to the domestic macroeconomic policy or export shocks speciﬁct ot h e
country.
Let βi be the factors loadings, they can be interpreted as the risk exposure of
the asset to the global factor. For instance, we should expect cross-listed stocks
to have a bigger risk exposure to the global factor than pure domestic stocks.
Similarly, stocks of exporting companies should have a greater risk exposure to
the world as compared to stocks of non exporting ﬁrms.
All investors know the distributions of U and the values of the βi.
The residuals Ui can be decomposed as follows:
Ui = βif1 + η1 for i =0 1 ,1






The decomposition of the Ui reﬂects the fact that the two emerging countries
do not share any common factor. However, each of them shares a common
factor with the developed country, and they both have cross-listed stocks in the
developed country.
3.5 Measuring Contagion from Emerging Market 1
3.6 to Emerging Market 2 in the Baseline Case
In this section, we derive two methods to measure contagion, one consists of
measuring the price response of assets in emerging market 1 to an information
or a liquidity shock in emerging market 2. The second approach consists of
a variance decomposition analysis to investigate which part of the variance of
prices in emerging market 2 is due to shocks in emerging market 1.
123.6.1 Measuring Contagion through Price Responses
3.6.2 to External Shocks
We use our model to derive the price response of each asset in emerging market
2 to information and liquidity shocks from another asset in emerging market 1.
We are able to decompose the price response into a component that is due the
revisions of expectations of uninformed investors and another component that
accounts for investors portfolio rebalancing actions.
The expression of equilibrium prices in equation (8) allows us to compute
the price response of assets by taking the derivative of P with respect to θ and
ε.
∂P
∂θ = M1.α2 + M2
Where α2 is the derivative of E(V |P) with respect to θ,deﬁned from equation




∂θ + M2 (9)
Similarly,
∂P
∂ε = M3 + M1α3
= M1.
∂(E(V |P))
∂ε + M3 (10)5
In each equation (9) and (10) the price response is in two terms, the ﬁrst
term represents an expectation component, and the second term a portfolio
balance component. The expectation component of the price change reﬂects
the part of the price that is due to revisions in the expectations of uninformed
investors. The portfolio balance component measures how prices would respond
to the shift in the excess demand curve for assets caused by the shocks if the
uninformed investors believed that the shock contained no information.
3.6.3 Measuring Contagion through Variance Decomposition
The unconditional variance of prices Va r(P) e n a b l e su st op e r f o r mav a r i a n c e
decomposition exercise. Indeed, we are able to measure the proportion of the
variance of an asset that is caused by shocks from another asset. This provides
us with another measure of how shocks are propagated from one emerging mar-
ket to another through the action of international investors trading cross-listed
stocks.
5The expressions of ∂P
∂ε and ∂P
∂θ show that they are uniquely function of the variances of
the shocks θ and ε.Therefore, they can be directly computed once we make assumptions about
their distributions.
13The 5 by 5 matrix Va r(P) can be determined using the decomposition of P
in equation (8).
Va r(P)=M(CΣθC0 + DΣεD0)M0 (11)
Where C and D are deﬁned in the Model Appendix.
Va r(P) is a function of the variances of the shocks θ, ε.
3.7 Results of the Baseline Case
In this section, we solve the baseline case of our model for a set of the most
simple parameters and distributional assumptions. We present the results of
contagion in terms of transmission of information and liquidity shocks from
assets in emerging country 1 to assets in emerging country 2 and in developed
country 0. We present both the price response and the variance decomposition
analysis.
3.7.1 Parameters’ Value and Distributional Assumptions
We set the risk exposure parameters values as summarized in Table 1.
The intuition for the choice of parameters values is that in the emerging
country the risk exposure to the common factor is greater for the international
asset than for the pure domestic asset, β01 =1 , whereas β1 =0 .5.





0 =1 , or the two emerging countries are symmetric for the developed
country.6
The supply of risky asset X is set equal to the 5 by 1 vector of ones.
Besides, one investor is informed for every 100 uninformed investors, that is
µI =1 , and µUI = 100. This ensures that prices do not fully reveal information
in equilibrium.
Investors’ risk tolerance parameter, τ is set equal to 1.
For the sake of simplicity, the risk factors fi, the country speciﬁcf a c t o r s
ηi, the information shocks θi, and the liquidity shocks εi are all independent
standard normal distributions, hence with variance 1.
We consider the price response of all assets to a one standard deviation
negative information shock and a one standard deviation negative liquidity shock
6We check how the results are aﬀected by changes in the values of the βi in the robustness
section.
14from asset 01. The results are presented in Figures 1 and 2. We can summarize
the results in three main points:
- A crisis in emerging country 1 aﬀects more the international asset than
t ot h ep u r ed o m e s t i ca s s e ti nc o u n t r y2 .
-A crisis in emerging country 1 that is caused by a shock to the interna-
tional asset has a greater repercussions in country 2 than a crisis that is caused
by a shock to the pure domestic asset.
-Finally, most of the price change in response to a shock comes from the
expectation component rather than the portfolio balance component. Therefore,
asymmetric information plays an important role in determining the magnitude
of contagion.
3.7.2 Shock to international Asset 01 from Emerging Market 1
In this section, we speciﬁcally trace back the eﬀect of a one standard deviation
negative information/liquidity shock to the international asset in country 1 to
all other assets. We give the intuition of the sign of the price response, and the
intuition for the results summarized earlier in the context of our baseline case.
Negative Information Shock Let’s assume that we start at equilibrium
for all portfolios. Then informed investors receive some additional negative
information about asset 01. As a consequence, they decrease their expectation
of asset 01 liquidation value by dθ01. Their optimal response is to sell some
of asset 01 regardless of whether the investor is from developed market 0 or
from emerging market 1. T h es a l ed e c r e a s e st h ep r i c eo fa s s e t01.U n i n f o r m e d
investors infer from the price decrease that informed investors have received a
negative signal for asset 01 and they also sell some asset 01, which reinforces
the initial price decrease.
Informed investors in emerging 1 have only access to asset 01 and asset 1, so
when they liquidate asset 01 their only option is to buy more of asset 1.T h u s ,
the demand for asset 1 should increase and the price of asset 1 should increase.
Informed investors in the developed country 0 have access to three assets:
0, 01,a n d02. So when they sell some of asset 01,t h i sl o w e r st h e i re x p o s u r et o
f1 below optimal level, they adjust their portfolio by buying some of asset 0,
but this increase their exposure to f2 above optimal level, which they adjust by
selling some of asset 02.
Informed sales of asset 02 are partially absorbed by investors from 2.T h e y
do so by selling oﬀ some of the pure domestic asset 2, whose price decreases. As
15a consequence, informed sales from the developed country depreciate the price
of asset 01,a s s e t02,a n da s s e t2, and increase the price of asset 1,a n da s s e t0.
Figure 1 presents the price response of all the assets to a shock to asset 01,
the results are obtained using the parametrization described above. Panel A.
presents the price response to a one standard deviation negative information
shock to asset 01. Panel B. presents the price response to a one standard devi-
ation negative liquidity shock to asset 01. The liquidity shocks are independent
from the information shocks.
Results presented in Figure 1, Panel A , conﬁrm this intuition in terms of
the sign of the price response of each asset. The table presents the eﬀect of a
one standard deviation negative information shock to the international asset 01
to all the assets. The price response is decomposed into an expectation com-
ponent and a portfolio balance component. Indeed, uninformed traders believe
that the action of informed traders might be motivated by negative expected
revenues for asset 01 rather than portfolio rebalancing needs. Thus, the expec-
tation component reﬂects the price change due to the revision of expectations
from uninformed traders, whereas the portfolio balance component represent
the change in prices due to adjustments to maintain the optimal risk exposure.
Figure 1, Panel A shows that shocks from the international asset 01 are
transmitted to both the international and the pure domestic asset in 2,e v e n
though the two countries do not share common factors. The most important
result from the table is that contagion aﬀects more international stock 02 than
the pure domestic stock 2. For instance, the total price response for asset 02 is
-0.073, whereas the one for its pure domestic asset 2 it is -0.046. Nevertheless,
the asset that experiences the shock, asset 01 is the most aﬀe c t e dw i t hat o t a l
price response of -0.628. The developed country stock is aﬀected with a price
response of 0.132. Finally, the shock is transmitted to the pure domestic asset
1, with a price response of 0.112. The price response of assets in country 2 are
of a lesser magnitude.
Figure 1, Panel A further highlights that for all assets, the expectation com-
ponent of the price response is greater than the portfolio balance component.
F o ri n s t a n c e ,f o rt h ee ﬀect on the domestic asset 1, the expectation component
is 0.33, whereas the portfolio balance is a mere 0.0005. Which suggests that
most of the price response comes from the actions of uninformed investors try-
ing to determine whether informed investors actions are motivated by expected
low proﬁts or portfolio rebalancing.
However, compared to the case where there is no market segmentation, and
there is no cross-listing, contagion is much less severe. Indeed, Kodres and
Pritsker (2002) assume that there is complete market integration, and investors
can freely invest in any assets from any country. They ﬁnd that the price
response for the market index in emerging country 2 is -0.39, which is much
16more than the -0.073 price change for asset 02, and the -0.046 price change for
asset 2. This suggests that in our model the market segmentation hypothesis
reduces the magnitude of contagion.7
Negative Liquidity Shock The eﬀect of a negative liquidity shock from asset
01 to all other assets is presented in Figure 1 Panel B.
Indeed, if we suppose that liquidity traders suddenly sell an amount dε1 of
asset 01. Then informed traders absorb some of the sales but not all, which
causes the price of 01 to decrease. Informed traders from emerging market 1
who bought asset 01, sell oﬀ some of asset 1, which decreases the price of 1.
Investors from the developed market who bought asset 01 sell oﬀ some of asset
0 to adjust their exposure to risk factor f1.8
T h es a l eo fa s s e t0 in the developed market lowers informed investors’ expo-
sure to risk factor f2 below optimal level, so they buy some asset 02 to compen-
sate. This increases the demand of asset 02, so the price of asset 02 increases
by 0.035. Uninformed investors in country 2 expect that the value of asset 02
increases also buy asset 02. For those investors, an increase in the acquisition of
asset 02 is accompanied by a sale of domestic asset 2, which decreases the price
of 2 by -0.09.
Overall, the price eﬀect of a negative liquidity shock from asset 1 is a decrease
in the price of assets 01, 2, and an increase in the price of asset 0, 02,a n d1.
3.7.3 Shocks to the Pure Domestic Asset 1
3.7.4 from Emerging Market 1
In this section, we investigate in the context of our baseline model, how shocks
from the pure domestic asset in emerging country 1 are transmitted to all as-
sets. We consider independent one standard deviation negative information and
liquidity shocks. More speciﬁc a l l y ,w ei n v e s t i g a t eh o ws h o c k sf r o mt h ep u r ed o -
mestic asset are diﬀerently transmitted to other assets than shocks from the
international asset. We ﬁnd similar direction in the price responses of the as-
sets; however, the magnitude is smaller for shocks originating from the pure
domestic asset 1 than for shocks originating from the international asset 01.
7Kodres and Pritsker (2002) use a similar parametrization , however they do not make
the distinction between developed countries and emerging countries. Moreover, their do not
have emerging market assets cross-listed in a developed market. Because emerging markets
are segmented.
8 This explains the fact that the portfolio balance component of the price response for
asset 0 is negative (-0.0087). Nevertheless the expectation component is positive (0.0776),
and overall the price of asset 0 increases by 0.069.
17Negative Information Shock Figure 2 presents the price response to shocks
on the pure domestic asset 1, Panel A presents the price response of all assets to
a one standard deviation negative information shocks, while Panel B presents
price response of all assets to a one standard deviation negative liquidity shocks.
The main result of the table is that shocks from pure domestic asset have
smaller repercussions than shocks from international assets.
A negative information shock to asset 01 changes the price of asset 02 by
-0.073 whereas the same shock from asset 1 creates a change of price of asset 02
by -0.046, or a 40% smaller price change.
A negative information shock ﬁrst causes informed investors to sell asset 1,
w h i c hr e s u l t si nad r o pi nt h ep r i c eo fa s s e t1. However, uninformed investor
infer from the drop of the price that informed investor may have some negative
information about the asset. Hence, they sell asset 1 too, reinforcing the initial
price decrease of asset 1 to -0.44.
Informed investors from emerging 1 readjust their portfolio exposure to the
common factor f1 by buying asset 01, which increases the price of asset 01 by
0.11. Informed investors from the developed country readjust their portfolio in
two steps. They ﬁrst buy asset 0, then they sell asset 02 to maintain an optimal
risk factor exposure relative to factors f1 and f2. The price of asset 02, therefore
decreases by -0.046.
The sales of asset 02 are partially absorbed by informed investors in country
2, who buy asset 02 and sell asset 2. Uninformed investors from country 2
observe the sale of asset 2 by informed investors. They infer that informed
investors sales are motivated by negative information on the valuation of asset
2. Some uninformed investors follow the signal and sell asset 2, increasing the
initial eﬀect to -0.029
Finally, the eﬀect of an information shock to asset 1 is a decrease in the price
of asset 1,a s s e t02,a n da s s e t2; and an increase in the price of asset 01,a n d
asset 0.
Negative Liquidity Shock Liquidity traders sell an amount dε1 of asset 1.
Informed investors absorb some of the sales but not all, which still causes the
price to decrease. Uninformed investors infer that they should sell too, which
further decrease the price of asset 1. Hence, the portfolio balance and the
expectation components of the price change are respectively -0.026 and -0.457.
However, informed investors in country 1 readjust their portfolios by selling
asset 01, which decreases the price of the asset by -0.023. Informed investors
in country 0 absorb some of the sales of asset 01 but not all, hence the price
18of asset 01 still decreases. Informed investors readjust their portfolio by selling
asset 0. As a consequence, uninformed investors in 0 also sell asset 01 and buy
asset 0 to rebalance their portfolio. This explain in Figure 2 Panel B the positive
expectation component for asset 0 of 0.049, and the negative portfolio balance
component of -0.0042. Overall the price of asset 0 increases by 0.045.
Informed investors from country 0 sell asset 02 to adjust their portfolio
exposure to f2. The sales are partially absorbed by informed investors from
country 2, who sell asset 2 and buy asset 02. Uninformed investors from country
2 mimic informed investors and also sell asset 2 and buy asset 02. Which results
in the positive price change for asset 02 by 0.022, and the negative price change
for asset 2 by -0.006.
3.8 Variance Decomposition
In this part, we use another measure of contagion by considering the proportion
of the variance of an asset that is caused by shocks from another asset. We
consider independent one standard deviation negative information and liquidity
shocks. More precisely, we investigate how shocks from asset 01 and asset 1 are
propagated to the international asset 02 and to the pure domestic asset 2. This
allow us to compare the impact of contagion to international stocks versus pure
domestic stocks. We ﬁnd that shocks to the international asset are transmitted
across countries with greater impact than shocks from the pure domestic asset.
Figure 2.3 presents the variance decomposition of prices as a function of
shocks to each asset.
The decomposition shows that shocks from the international asset have a
greater impact than shocks from purely domestic asset. Indeed, shocks from
asset 01 represent 8% of the variance of asset 02 and 7% of the variance of asset
2. In contrast, shocks from asset 1 represent 5% of the variance of asset 02 and
5% of the variance of asset 2.
Shocks from international asset represent 31% of the variance of asset 0,
whereas shocks from purely domestic asset represent only 19% of the variance
of asset 0.
Not surprisingly, the table also conﬁrms the fact that shocks to a particular
asset predominantly aﬀects that stock Indeed, shocks to international asset 01
represent 74% of its variance, shock to asset 1 represent 13% of the variance of
asset 01, whereas shocks to asset 02 and 2 represent respectively 8% and 5% of
the variance of asset 01. However, shocks to domestic asset 1 represent around
71% of their own variance, shocks to asset 01 represent 17% of the variance of
asset 1, while shocks to asset 02 and asset 2 represent respectively 7% and 5%
of the variance of asset 1.
19We notice that the portion of variance of country 1 asset due to shock in coun-
try 2 is relatively modest (between 5% and 8%), which suggests a more modest
contagion, when markets are segmented by barriers to investment, as opposed to
the case of perfect market integration described in Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
Overall, our results show that information and liquidity shocks to assets in
country 1 will aﬀect both the international and the domestic stock in country
2, with a relative lesser impact on the domestic stock than on the interna-
tional stock. More importantly, shocks to the international asset are transmit-
ted across countries with greater impact than shocks from the pure domestic
asset. Moreover, if investors in the developed market transmits shocks across the
two emerging countries through portfolio hedging and cross-market rebalancing.
Uninformed investors herding in all countries exacerbates contagion.
The ﬁndings in this section support those of Calvo (1998) and Calvo and
Mendoza (1999), that international capital markets act as carrier of emerging
market crises. Moreover, when information is asymmetric, herding is a proﬁtable
strategy for uninformed investors, associated with a higher risk of contagion.
Indeed, our results show that most of the price response to shocks comes from
the expectation component, which reﬂects price changes due to the actions
of uninformed investors trying to interpret whether the actions of informed
investors are motivated by expected low returns or portfolio rebalancing.
Contributions in the literature that focus on the role of international ﬁrms
in spreading contagion across emerging markets also support our ﬁndings. In-
deed Frankel and Schmukler (1996) show empirical evidence of contagion from
Mexican country funds. They highlight a pattern of contagion where domestic
investors react ﬁrst to shocks, then transmit them to other emerging countries
through New York. Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2002) use data on investable
stocks, whose shares are open to foreigners, versus non-investable stocks to
investigate contagion. They ﬁnd that there is more transmission of crises in in-
vestable stocks that are open to foreigners as compared to non-investable stocks.
3.9 Robustness
In order to better understand our results, we investigate how they are aﬀected
by changes in the degree of informationa s y m m e t r yi na l lt h r e ec o u n t r i e s ,t h e
exposure to common risk factors through the βs , and the exposure to country
speciﬁc risk through Va r(η).
203.9.1 No Asymmetric Information in the Developed Market
In this section, we relax the previous assumption that the proportion of informed
i n v e s t o r sv e r s u su n i n f o r m e di n v e s t o r si sthe same in all three countries. Instead,
we assume that all investors are uninformed in the developed market. The
assumption is consistent with the ﬁndings of Frankel and Schmukler (1996)
that investors in emerging markets may be better informed about assets in
their country than international investors. One explanation might be that local
investors are on site and hence are more able to monitor the ﬁrm as well as
the economic environment of the country. Using country-funds data, Frankel
and Schmukler (1996) show that during the 1994 Peso crisis, local investors lost
conﬁdence in the market before investors in New York.
In order to illustrate the importance of the diﬀerential in market trans-
parency between emerging countries and developed countries, we solve the sim-
pliﬁed case where there is no asymmetric information in the developed country.
The results are presented in Figure 4. They are similar to those related to the
case of asymmetric information. We do not ﬁnd that information asymmetry
reduces the sensitivity of the developed market prices to order ﬂow, and there-
fore reduces their exposure to contagion. T h i ss u g g e s t st h a ti n v e s t o r si nt h e
developed market are less aﬀected by contagion, as suggested by Kodres and
Pritsker (2002), only if they are all informed as opposed to a situation where
they are all uninformed.
3.9.2 More Information Asymmetry in Emerging Markets
In this section, we investigate the impact of relaxing the assumption the variance
of all information shocks is set to one on our results. Indeed, the amount of
information asymmetry for asset 02 can be measured by the variance of the
information shock to the international asset in country 2, Va r(θ02).
More speciﬁcally, we consider the eﬀect on the price responses of an increase
in the amount of information asymmetry for asset 02, when Va r(θ02) take any
value in the interval [0,5].
Figure 5 presents the graph of the price response of international asset 02
and pure domestic asset 2 to an information shock and a liquidity shock from
international asset 01, as a function of Va r(θ02), which varies from 0 to 5
The graph illustrates that the price response of asset 02 to an informa-
tion shock from asset 01 increases with the information asymmetry in stock
02. However the price response of asset 2 is not much aﬀected by information
asymmetry for stock 02. The price response to liquidity shock follows the same
pattern. Indeed, uninformed investors in country 2 ﬁrst think that the order
ﬂow is due to expected low values for the asset rather than investors’ portfo-
lio rebalancing, and they increase the price response. The graph suggests that
information asymmetry for stock 02 increases transmission of information and
21liquidity shocks to stock 02. Therefore we would have obtained greater price
response for asset 02 than what we obtained for the baseline model. However,
the amount of information asymmetry for asset 02 does not really aﬀect the
price response of stock 2. Hence, we can assume that the price response of asset
2 would not have changed. Overall our results are robust to changes in the
amount of information asymmetry for asset 02, as measured by Va r(θ02).
3.9.3 Risk Exposure of the International Asset
3.9.4 to the Common Factor f2
I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,w es e tt h ev a l u eo fβ02 to one. In this section, we
investigate how our results are aﬀected by changes in the value of β02, for any
value of β02 in the interval [0,5].I n t u i t i v e l y ,β02 can be interpreted as the risk
exposure of the international asset 02 to the common factor f2, as β02 increases
we should expect greater transmission of shocks to both the international asset
02 and the domestic asset 2. Indeed, the more open the international stock is
to the common factor the more useful it is to rebalance portfolio.
Figure 6 presents the price response of international asset 02 and pure do-
mestic asset 2 to an information shock and a liquidity shock from international
asset 01 as a function of β02, for values of β02 b e t w e e n0a n d5 .The price re-
sponse of the domestic asset 2 to an information shock from asset 01 increases
with β02. In contrast, the price response of the international asset 02 to an infor-
mation shock from asset 01 increases with the risk exposure of the international
asset β02 for values of β02 b e t w e e n0a n d2 .T h e ni td e c r e a s e sf o rv a l u e so fβ02
greater than 2. Indeed, as β02 increases, the international asset 02 become more
useful for hedging the risk exposure to f2. Hence, the transmission of informa-
tion shocks increases with the risk exposure of the international asset in country
2. We should expect more important price responses for both the international
asset 02 and the domestic asset 2. However, for values of β02 above 2, the asset
looses its diversiﬁcation properties as it is "too" open to the common factor. As
investors from country 2 use less the international asset 02 for diversiﬁcation,
the price response of asset 02 should decrease as compared to the baseline case.9
3.9.5 Country Risk in Country 2
The country risk is measured by the variance of the country speciﬁcf a c t o rη2,
Va r(η2). I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,w ea s s u m e dt h a tVa r(η2) was equal to one.
9When the shock from asset 01 is a liquidity shock we observe a similar pattern but with
a lower threshold value. The price response of asset 02 increases for values of β02 between
0 and 1. Then it decreases with β02 for values of β02 greater than 1. The price response of
asset 2 decreases for values of β02 b e t w e e n0a n d2 .T h e ni ti n c r e a s e sf o rv a l u e so fβ02 greater
than 2.
22In this part, we investigate the implication for our results if we assume that
Va r(η2) c a nt a k ea n yv a l u ei nt h ei n t e r v a l[0,5]. The intuition is that the
greater the country risk in country 2, the less useful the international asset 02
is to rebalance international investors portfolio. Therefore we should expect
smaller price responses as compared to the baseline results.
Figure 7 presents the price response of international asset 02 and pure do-
mestic asset 2 to an information shock and a liquidity shock from international
asset 01 as a function of the country risk in country 2 measured by Va r(η2),
for values of Va r(η2) in the interval [0,5].
The price response to an information shock from asset 01 increases with the
country factor for both the domestic and the international asset in country 2.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that when the shock is a liquidity shock, the price response of
asset 02 decreases when the country risk increases. However, the price response
for asset 2 decreases for values of Va r(η2) lower than 1, and increases for values
of Va r(η2) greater than 1.
Overall, the main results of the baseline model are maintained when we
depart from the parametrization set for β02,Va r(η2), and Va r(θ2).
4C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section, we investigate whether the channels of contagion highlighted in
our model through the portfolio rebalancing actions of international investors
with stocks cross-listed in the U.S. can explain part or the whole of the trans-
mission of the Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile. We deﬁne the Brazilian
crisis as a combination of information, liquidity, and country speciﬁcs h o c k s .
We calibrate the model using a dataset that distinguishes international ﬁrms
from purely domestic ﬁrms in Brazil, Mexico, and Chile. Given our calibrated
model, we determine which combination of shocks generates some transmission
of Brazil’s shocks to Chile and Mexico. We compare the prediction of our model
to what happened in Chile and Mexico as shown in our data. More speciﬁcally,
our data predicts that the Brazilian crisis had negative repercussions in both the
i n t e r n a t i o n a la n dt h ep u r ed o m e s t i ca sset in Chile and Mexico. Furthermore,
international assets were slightly more aﬀected than pure domestic stocks. We
ﬁnd that our calibrated model can produce some modest transmission of the
Brazilian crisis to Chile and Mexico that is consistent with the data (and the
result of the baseline case of the model). The calibration highlights the role
of important liquidity shocks are a determinant of contagion through portfolio
rebalancing of cross-listed assets during the Brazilian crisis.
234.1 Expression of Assets Returns in the Model
From our model, we use the valuation of assets at second period and the price at
ﬁrst period to model returns for the assets as a function of the common factors,
the country speciﬁc shocks, the liquidity shocks and the information shocks.
We decompose the valuations of assets as:
V = θ + βf + η (12)
We can express returns R in the model as the diﬀerence between the second
period valuation V and the ﬁrst period price P,f r o me q u a t i o n(8).
R = V − P
= θ + βf + η − [(M0 + M1α1)+( M1α2 + M2)θ +( M1α3 + M3)ε]
= −(M0 + M1α1)+( I5 − M1α2 − M2)θ + βf − (M1α3 + M3)ε + η
The Mi and the αi depend on Va r(U), Va r(θ), and Va r(ε) as seen in the
Model Appendix. The expression can be rewritten as:
R = α + βf + γθ+ δε+ η (13)
Where
f is the vector of common factors
θ is the vector of information shocks
ε is the vector of liquidity shocks
η is the vector of country speciﬁcf a c t o r s
Let’s deﬁne
Res = γθ+ δε+ η.
We can rewrite the returns equation as:
R = α + βf + Res (14)10
10α = R − βf
Where R and f respectively represent the mean of R and f.
244.2 Matching the Model to the Data
The reduced form of equation (14) allows us to use our data to set the parameters
βsso that the covariance of the returns in the model are equal to the covariances
of returns in the data sample. In order, to get the βs from the data, we need to
construct the analog of the assets in our model using the data. The following
paragraph brieﬂy presents the data and describes how we match the model to
the data.
We use a unique ﬁrm-level dataset we constructed by individually match-
i n gp a r e n ts t o c k st oA D R s 11 and cross-listed stocks using Bloomberg and the
International Finance Corporation Emerging Market Database (IFC EMDB).
Overall, we have weekly data from 01/14/1994 to 12/30/2000 on 344 stocks
from Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. The data includes price as well as ADRs pro-
grams eﬀective dates in a U.S. exchange (if any) for each stock in our sample.
Hence we are able for each stock to determine whether its issuing ﬁrm has or
has not issued and American Depository Receipts (ADR) or listed in the NYSE
before the Brazilian crisis12. With that information, we are able to distinguish
international stocks from pure domestic stocks before the crisis. We construct
for each country, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico an international index based on a
portfolio of equally weighted international stocks and a domestic index based
on portfolio of equally weighted pure domestic stocks. We also use the Morgan
Stanley Capital Index ( MSCI World Index) as a proxy for the world common
factor, and the S&P500 index as a proxy of the pure domestic stock in the U.S.
Hence, the returns of asset 0 from the developed country in our model are rep-
resented by the sample returns of the S&P500 index, the returns of the common
factor in our model are represented by the returns of the MSCI World Index
from the data.
.
Moreover, Brazil represents emerging market 1 (and the crisis country too).
The returns of the international asset in Brazil, asset 01 are represented in the
data by the sample returns of the international index that we constructed using
stocks of Brazilian ﬁr m st h a ti s s u e dA D R so rc r o s s - l i s t e di nt h eU . S .b e f o r et h e
crisis. The returns of the pure domestic asset in Brazil, asset 1 are represented by
the sample returns of the domestic index that we constructed with stocks of ﬁrms
in Brazil that did not issue American Depository Receipts (ADR) or list in the
U.S. prior to the Brazilian crisis. Emerging market 2, is either Mexico or Chile
and the international asset 02 can be similarly obtained in our our sample using
the index of Mexican or Chilean ﬁrms that issued American Depository Receipts
(ADR) or listed in the U.S. prior to The Brazilian crisis. The pure domestic
11For each ADR traded in a foreign exchange, there is an underlying domestic stock from
the same company that is traded in the domestic stock. The ADR is redeemable for a given
number of shares of the parent stock. Therefore, we consider for the "international stock"
, the parent stock of the ADR, which is traded in the domestic market. And the ﬁrm that
issues and ADR is considered an international ﬁrm.
12W eu s ef o rt h ec u to ﬀ date for the Brazilian crisis December 1998.
25asset 2 is represented by the returns of the pure domestic index of Mexican or
Chilean ﬁrms that never issued American Depository Receipts (ADR) or listed
in a U.S. exchange before the crisis.
We use our sample to run the regression implied by our model in equation
(14) during the period preceding the crisis from 1/14/1994 to 6/19/1998 as
follows.
R = α + βfWorld+ Res
First, from the regression, we are able to identify the parameters β so that
the covariance of the returns in the model are equal to the covariances of returns
in the sample.
Second, from equation (14), we infer that the variance of the information
shock, the liquidity shock, and the country speciﬁcs h o c k(Va r(θ),Var(ε), and Va r(η))
are not separately identiﬁed (and not separately identiﬁable from γ and δ). Only
t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h es u mi si d e n t i ﬁed, Va r(Res).
Also, we can identify one parameter γ or δ if we deﬁne the crisis in Brazil
by a shock (be it an information shock, a liquidity shock, or a country speciﬁc
shock only), and the magnitude of the shock can be deﬁn e da ss u c ha si te q u a t e s
the variance of residuals Va r(Res) during the pre-crisis period to the variance
of residuals during the crisis period.
However, when we do so, the calibrated model does not yield any trans-
mission of shocks to other assets, which suggests that in order to get some
cross-market transmission of shock we need to deﬁne the crisis in Brazil as a
combination of diﬀerent shocks. Then, even if we assume that the magnitude of
the shock matches pre-crisis variance to post-crisis variance, the parameters γ
and δ remain separately unidentiﬁable from Va r(θ), and Va r(ε). Therefore, we
need to set some values for the parameters γ and δ. For each set of parameters,
we need to consider several scenario where we vary the diﬀerent contributions
of the variance of each shock to the variance of the residuals.
More speciﬁcally we consider diﬀerent weights represented by the triplet
(x,y,z), such that :
Va r(Res)=γ2Va r(θ)+δ
2Va r(ε)+Va r(η)
γ2Va r(θ)=( x%)Va r(Res)
δ
2Va r(ε)=( y%)Va r(Res)
Va r(η)=( z%)Va r(Res)
26We are specially interested in determining which combinations of shocks
(x,y,z) can yield a price response of the Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile
that is similar to what what we observe in the data. That is such that the
crisis in Brazil has negative repercussions in both the international and the
pure domestic asset in Chile and Mexico. Furthermore, international assets are
slightly more aﬀected by the crisis than pure domestic stocks.
However, we need to make some additional assumptions about the other
unidentiﬁed parameters of the model. Speciﬁcally, the numbers of informed
investors µI and the number of uninformed investors µUI always appears multi-
plied by the risk tolerance parameter τ, which suggests that µI,µ UI, and τ are
not separately identiﬁed in our model. We set investors risk tolerance τ to 1 and
assume that for one informed investor there is a hundred uninformed investors,
that is µI =1and µUI = 100. The 5 by 1 vector of supply of risky asset X is
not identiﬁed, we set it to the 5 by 1 vector of one for simplicity.
4.3 Results
Figure 9 presents the sample regression coeﬃcients β for Brazil, Mexico, and
Chile during the crisis, and the sample estimate of the variance of the residuals.
Figure 2.10 presents the price response in Chile and Mexico to a one standard
deviation information shock from Brazil as a function of the relative size of all
shocks. The set of parameter considered is γ =0 .001 and δ =0 .0001.13
We ﬁnd three main results:
-Liquidity shocks seem to be the most important determinant for the Brazil-
ian crisis to be transmitted to Mexico and Chile. Indeed, information shocks
alone, or country speciﬁc shocks alone cannot explain any transmission of the
crisis in Chile and Mexico. For instance, a scenario of (1, 98,1) for both Chile
and Mexico, where the variance of the information shocks represent 98% of the
total variance of residuals does not yield any transmission of the crisis. Simi-
larly, a scenario where the variance of the country speciﬁc shocks represent 98%
of the total variance of residuals does not yield any transmission of the crisis for
Both Chile and Mexico (See Figure 10). In contrast, a scenario where the vari-
ance of liquidity shocks represent 98% of the total variance of residuals yields
contagion. Interestingly, a scenario where liquidity shocks and country speciﬁc
shocks have similar weight ( respectively 40% and 60%) and information shocks
are negligible also yields contagion.
However, the price response are quite modest in comparison to what the
data predicts, we get a mere 0.3% negative price response for the international
13The price response change as a function of the values set for the parameters γ and δ. For
this set of value presented we obtain some transmission of the crisis to Mexico and Chile.
27asset in Chile (for the (60,0.1,39.9%) scenario), which suggest that our model
can explain part of the transmission of the Brazilian crisis to Chile and Mexico.
-Whenever, the liquidity shocks and the country speciﬁc shocks are impor-
tant enough to generate contagion, there is more transmission of shocks to inter-
national ﬁrms than to pure domestic ﬁrms. For instance (for the (60,0.1,39.9%)
scenario), for Mexico, we get a price response of 1% to the international stock
02, and a mere price response of 0.04% for the pure domestic stock 2. Similarly,
the same scenario for Chile yields a price response of 0.3% for the international
asset versus 0.2% for the response for the international asset (see Figure 10).
-The bigger the size of the liquidity shocks, the more transmission of the
shock. For instance in Mexico, a scenario where the variance of liquidity shocks
is 60% of the total variance of residuals yields a price response of the interna-
tional stock of 1%, while a scenario where the variance of liquidity shocks is less
than 40% yields a price response of the international stock in Chile of 0.7%.
-In all scenario, the developed country is unaﬀected by the crisis, which is
consistent with the fact that U.S. market were unaﬀected by the Brazilian crisis.
Our model highlights a new channel of contagion of the Brazilian crisis to
Mexico and Chile through the portfolio rebalancing of cross-listed stocks in the
U.S. The direction of the price response in Chile and Mexico to the Brazilian
crisis is consistent with the data (and the result of the baseline case of the
model) for important liquidity shocks. Indeed, we get a negative price response
for both the international and the pure domestic asset in Mexico and Chile,
and the international asset is slightly more aﬀected than the pure domestic
asset. However, the magnitude of contagion is quite modest. This could mean
that our model can only partially explain the transmission of the Brazilian
crisis to Mexico and Chile. Or that the role of investors induced contagion was
overestimated during the Brazilian crisis. An alternative explanation is that we
get a modest transmission of the crisis in the model because of the assumption
of market segmentation in emerging markets, which reduces the magnitude of
contagion. And this explanation would support other theories in the literature
that argue that the magnitude of contagion has been overestimated in the Asian
crisis and the Brazilian crisis. Forbes and Rigobon (2002), for instance, argue
that most countries in emerging markets did not experience contagion, but
rather a continuation of pre-existing macroeconomic interdependence.
The results conﬁrm that the model can at least partially explain the fact that
the Brazilian crisis was transmitted to international ﬁrms in Chile and Mexico
through the action of international investors trading stocks cross-listed in the
U.S.. However, this requires certain assumptions for the relative size of the vari-
ance of liquidity , information, and country speciﬁcs h o c k s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,w e
ﬁnd that liquidity shocks are the main component to achieve contagion in our
model, country speciﬁc shocks do play a role too when combined with liquidity
28shocks of a certain size. Information shocks however, cannot generate transmis-
sion of the Brazilian crisis, even if they are paired with sizeable country speciﬁc
shocks.
These results are consistent with the "facts" of the 1998 Brazilian crisis:
it was seen as an aftermath of the Russian Default, the Brazilian macroeco-
nomic environment was weak and vulnerable. For international investors it was
predictable that Brazil would be hit by the crisis next. As for self fulﬁlling
prophecies, liquidity ﬂed out of the country and the economic conditions wors-
ened. In that context, it is plausible that liquidity and country speciﬁcs h o c k s
seemed to have been the determinants of the transmission of the Brazilian crisis
to Mexico and Chile rather than information shocks.
5W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
By cross-listing in a developed exchange, emerging market ﬁrms are able to
raise capital at a lower cost and diversify their shareholder base. However, the
succession of crises in the nineties proved that contagion could be a cost of
cross-listing. Our model conﬁrms that when there is a crisis, international ﬁrms
are more aﬀected by contagion than pure domestic ﬁrms. It is of interest to
assess whether contagion jeopardizes the beneﬁts for emerging markets ﬁrms to
cross-list their assets in developed exchanges. In this section, we address this
issue by investigating whether from a welfare standpoint, investors are better oﬀ
in autarky or in cross-listing. We use in this section, the same parametrization
that we used to solve the baseline case of the model, described in Table 1.
5.1 Financial Autarky
In the ﬁnancial autarky scenario, all markets are separated like small island
economies. Thus, there is no distinction between the developed country and the
emerging countries, all countries are the same. In each economy, there is a single
type of domestic asset, as cross-listing is not an option. Hence, when faced with
a shock, investors cannot diversify as all assets are identical and there are no
outside opportunities.
We assume that investors in each country can only trade assets in their own
market. Let’s assume that there is a single risky asset denoted X and a riskless
asset that pay a gross return normalized to 1.
5.1.1 Informed Investors
The informed investor chooses his position XI in the risky assets X to maximize
his end of period wealth W2, conditional on information, θ.
29We compute the expected utility levels over the probabilities distributions
for all shocks (θ,ε,U) for informed investors in the autarky case

























The expected utility of the uninformed investor in the autarky case can be
written as
EUI = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
= −1
(1+2V −1BΣε)1/2(1+2V −1DΣθ)1/2 exp{−W1
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In the cross-listing case, we consider the ﬁnancial internationalization through
cross-listings scenario. There are two main diﬀerences with the autarky case:
ﬁrst, in the autarky case there is a single risky asset, and second there is no
distinction between developed and emerging economies. Now, cross-listings al-
low us to consider two diﬀerent types of assets in each country: an international
asset and a pure domestic asset and two diﬀerent types of economies: a de-
veloped market and emerging market. More importantly, investors now diﬀer
not only with regards to information access, but also in their access to diﬀerent
types of assets. Investors in the emerging country have access to international
and pure domestic stocks from their country, which allows them to rebalance
their portfolio when faced with a shock. This rebalancing was not available to
them in the autarky case. Investors in the developed country can now diversify
their portfolio. They have access to three types of stocks from three countries.
Hence, cross-country contagion, which was impossible in the autarky case is now
possible.
Another technical diﬀerence from autarky is that now θ,P,ε, and U are 5
by 1 vectors instead of scalars. The matrices ´ Mi (for i =0 ,1,2,3) are also 5
by 5 matrices.
305.2.1 Informed Investor i from Country i
We use the derivation of the utility for informed investors in the autarky case
to infer the utility Ei
I of the informed investor in country i in the cross-listing
case. Besides, the diﬀerence in dimension, in the cross-listing case investors have
access to several assets, and the 5 by 5 matrices Ni represent the assets each
investor i can invest in. Whereas, in the autarky case, there was a single asset
and investor could only invest in that one asset.
The expected utility levels over the probabilities distributions for all shocks
(θ,ε,U) for informed investors in the cross-listing case is as follows:
EI
i = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
= −{A0
i(2I − ΣUAi)c0Σεc + A0













i(2I − ΣUAi)c0Σεc + I)0−1]b0Σθb + I)}0−1]
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5.2.2 Uninformed Investor i from Country i
We also use the derivation of the utility for uninformed investors in the autarky
case to infer the utility Ei
UI of uninformed investors in country i in the cross-
listing case. Again, besides the diﬀerence in dimension, in the cross-listing case
investors can invest in diﬀerent assets.
The expected utility of the uninformed investor in the cross-listing case can
be written as
Ei
UI = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
To simplify the notation let’s deﬁne AVi = Va r(V |P)−1Ni
Ei
UI =e x p ( −W1/τ) ∗ Eθ,ε,U exp[−(E(V |P) − P)0AV 0
i (V − P)]
= −((2k + Σ−1
ε )Σε + I)−1/2((2Q + Σ
−1
θ )Σθ + I)−1/2 exp−{W1
τ + n +
m0















315.3 Change in Consumption Level from Autarky
5.4 to Cross-listing.
In this section, we express the change in utility levels for investors from au-
tarky to cross-listing in terms of change in consumption levels. Speciﬁcally, we
measure the increase or decrease in the autarky consumption level necessary for
each type of investor to enjoy the same level of utility than in the cross-listing
scenario. The end of period wealth, W2 determines the consumption level.










2 are respectively, the end of period wealth in autarky
and the end of period wealth with cross-listing.
We would like to determine C, t h ec h a n g ei nt h eﬁnal period wealth when
we move from autarky to cross-listing, C is such that:













If C is greater than 1, then we need to increase the autarky consumption
to enjoy the utility level achieved with cross-listing, which means that investors
are worse oﬀ in the autarky scenario as they consume less and better oﬀ in the
cross-listing scenario as they consume more.
If C is smaller than 1, then we need to decrease the autarky consumption
to enjoy the same utility level than in cross-listing, which means that investors
are better oﬀ in the autarky scenario as they consume more and worse oﬀ in the
cross-listing scenario which is associated to less consumption.
Figure 8 presents the results of the welfare analysis suggests. The main
i m p l i c a t i o n so ft h et a b l ea r et h a tw h e nw em o v ef r o mas i t u a t i o no fﬁnancial
autarky to one of cross-listing:
32-Informed investors in all country are worse oﬀ ( C0 =0 .56,C 1 =0 .69,C 2 =
0.64) because they move from a situation where they have the monopoly of pri-
vate information and they can extract all the rent associated to it to a situation
where the informed investors from the developed country has the same informa-
tion than him on the cross-listed stock. In fact, cross-listing and ADRs issuance
are associated with an increase in the quality and the quantity of information
publicly available on the stocks that cross-list. Indeed, emerging market ﬁrms
that cross-list must comply with the accounting standards of the exchange where
they cross-list (see Miller (1999)). Hence, informed investors get less rent from
being informed when we move from autarky to cross-listing.
-Uninformed investors are better oﬀ in all countries with cross-listing because
it is associated with more informed investors. Thus, prices reveal more private
information from informed investors. In a sense, the market is more eﬃcient as
price reﬂect better the fundamentals of the assets.
-As uninformed investors represent over 99% of all investors, overall cross-
listing is associated with more consumption than autarky. Thus, cross-listing is
preferable to autarky.
-The information beneﬁts associated with cross-listing change the original
costs of contagion versus beneﬁto fd i v e r s i ﬁcation analysis. Indeed, investors
from the developed country are the only ones in our model to fully appreciate
the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, they hold three assets from three countries. In
contrast, investors from the emerging countries hold two assets from their own
country. However, Figure 8 shows that investors from the developed country
have the same experience than investors from emerging countries: informed
investors are better oﬀ in autarky, uninformed investors are better oﬀ with
cross-listing. This suggests that the information beneﬁts associated with cross-
listing outweigh the costs of contagion. This holds even though diversiﬁcation
comes with an increased exposure to contagion. Figure 2.8 shows that informed
investor from the developed country have their consumption reduced by more
when they move from autarky to cross-listing ( C0 =0 .56 versus C1 =0 .69
and C2 =0 .64). And uninformed investors from the developed country have
their consumption increased by less (than for uninformed investors in emerging
countries) when they move from autarky to cross-listing (C0 =1 .66 versus
C1 =1 .69).
A priori, the values of the consumption cost or gain of moving from autarky
to cross-listing seem quite high, however they can be explained by the fact
that we choose an arbitrary parametrization (that of the baseline case), that
might not exactly predict "reasonable" values. Furthermore, there are several
shocks in our model, that make prices quite volatile. Finally, the assumption
of asymmetric information among investors is another source of distortion that
can explain the big values of the consumption cost/gains. More importantly,
the welfare comparison emphasizes that when an economy moves from autarky
33to cross-listing some individuals have a lower utility, while others experience
and increase in their utility level.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We investigate whether contagion is a cost of international cross-listing for
emerging market ﬁrms. We develop a rational expectations model of conta-
gion where some emerging market ﬁrms cross-list their stocks in a developed
exchange. We model the fact that markets are segmented along emerging mar-
ket borders, so that cross-listing is the only way for foreign investors to invest
in emerging market stocks and for emerging market ﬁrms to access developed
capital markets.
We ﬁnd that contagion is a cost of internationalization as the price response
in one emerging country to a shock in another emerging country is signiﬁcantly
greater for cross-listed stocks than for pure domestic stocks. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd that a shock in one emerging market aﬀects the stocks of all the other
emerging markets that have cross-listed stocks in the same developed market.
These ﬁndings support Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Mendoza (1999), that in-
ternational capital markets act as carrier of emerging market crises. However,
the magnitude of contagion that we ﬁnd is more modest than reported in pa-
pers on contagion like Kodres and Pritsker (2002) that assume that all markets
are perfectly integrated. The discrepancy in the magnitude of contagion found
suggests that market segmentation in emerging markets may reduce the trans-
mission of shocks from other markets and that some previous studies may have
overestimated the magnitude of contagion.
As an application of our model, we investigate whether the contagion of
the 1998 Brazilian crisis to Mexico and Chile could be spread by the action of
international buying and selling stocks cross-listed in the U.S. We calibrate our
model using stock price data of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and the U.S.. We ﬁnd that
our model can indeed explain some of the transmission of the Brazilian crisis
to Mexico and Chile and the model further indicates the crucial determinants
of contagion in that case, were negative liquidity shocks and country speciﬁc
shocks.
Our initial results suggested that emerging markets ﬁrms should cautiously
consider internationalization to developed exchanges as cross-listing is associ-
ated with more exposure to cross-market contagion. Against this backdrop, the
welfare analysis of internationalization versus autarky concludes that the ben-
eﬁts of internationalization in terms of reducing information asymmetry and
increasing market eﬃciency are greater than the costs of contagion.
347A p p e n d i x
7.1 Model Appendix
7.1.1 Expression of E(V |P)
E(V |P)=E(V |S(P))
= V + Cov(V,S(P)) ∗ [Va r(S(P))]−1 ∗ [S(P) − E(S(P))]
We use the fact that
V = θ + U
S(P)=( µIτA)−1ε + θ
ε and θ are normal therefore S(P) is normal too.
Finally,










E(V |P) can be expressed as a linear function of shocks





















357.1.2 Expression of Va r(V |P)
Va r(V |P)=Va r(V |S(P))
= Va r(V ) − Cov(V,S(P)) ∗ [Va r(S(P))]−1 ∗ Cov(V,S(P))0
We use the fact that
V = θ + U
S(P)=( µIτA)−1ε + θ
ε and θ are normal therefore S(P) is normal too.
We get







7.1.3 Expressions of the Mi in the Equilibrium Price







7.1.4 Variance of P
Va r(P)=Va r(M0 + M1α1 +( M2 + M1α2)θ +( M3 + M1α3)ε)
= M ∗ I ∗ M0





























and D = C A−1
τµI ,
Then
Va r(P)=M(CΣθC0 + DΣεD0)M0
8 Welfare analysis Appendix
We compute the expected utility levels over the probabilities distributions for
all shocks for informed and uninformed investors. We compare the levels for
autarky to the levels for ﬁnancial cross-listing. We extensively present the com-
putation for the autarky case, then we present the result for the cross-listing
case, which is a generalization of the autarky under some conditions that we
expose.
8.1 Autarky case
We assume that investors in each country can only trade assets in their own
market, they cannot cross-list them in a developed exchange. Let’s assume that
there is a single risky asset denoted X and a riskless asset that pay a gross return
normalized to 1. Thus there is no distinction between the developed country
and the emerging countries.
8.1.1 Informed investors
The informed investor chooses his position XI in the risky assets X to maximize
his end of period wealth W2, conditional on information, θ.
The expected utility of the informed investor in the autarky case is
E = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
where W2 = W1 + X0
I (V − P)
And XI = τΣ
−1
U (θ − P).
Hence, the informed investor’s end of period wealth can be written as
W2 = W1 + τΣ
−1
U (θ − P)(V − P)
= W1 + τΣ
−1
U [(θ − P)2 +( θ − P)U]
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U follows a normal distribution with mean U, and variance ΣU. The distri-
bution of U is independent from the distributions of ε,and θ.
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2 (θ − P + U)2
´
|θ]
P is a function of θ, ε, and we can express θ−P +U as a function of θ, and
ε.a n dt h eMi.
Let’s deﬁne the terms a,b,c such that:
a = −M0 − M1α1
b =1− M2 − M1α2
c = −M3 − M1α3
Where the αi and the Mi were deﬁned earlier.
Then
θ − P + U = a + bθ + cε + U
ε and θ follow independent normal distributions,
Hence, conditional on the information shock θ,
¡









a + bθ + U
¢
,c 2Σε),
38Proposition 1 If a random variable x follows normal distribution with mean



















































































































The information shock θ follow a normal distribution with mean θ, and
variance Σθ , by linearity of the normal distribution
a + bθ + U ∼ N
¡
a + bθ + U,b2Σθ
¢





















































The expected utility of the uninformed investor in the autarky case can be
written as
EUI = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
where W2 = W1 + X0
UI(V − P)
And XUI = τVar(V |P)−1(E(V |P) − P).
Hence, uninformed investor’s end of period wealth can be written as
W2 = W1 + τVar(V |P)−1(E(V |P) − P)(V − P)
To simplify the notation let’s deﬁne V = Va r(V |P)
EUI = −exp(−W1
τ ) ∗ Eθ,ε,U exp[−V −1(E(V |P) − P)(V − P)]
Let also deﬁne the terms d, e,a n df using the αi deﬁned earlier such that
d = α1 − M0 − M1α1
e = α2 − M2 − M1α2
f = α3 − M3 − M1α3
E(V |P) − P = d + eθ + fε
As in the informed investors case
V − P = θ − P + U = a + bθ + cε + U
Where a, b,a n dc were deﬁned earlier
(E(V |P) − P)(V − P)=( d + eθ + fε) ∗ (a + bθ + cε + U)
=( d + eθ + fε) ∗ (a + bθ + cε)+( d + eθ + fε)U
EUI = −exp−W1
τ ∗Eθ,ε{exp−V −1(d+eθ+fε)∗(a+bθ+cε)∗EU[exp−V −1(d+
eθ + fε)U|θ,ε]}
U, θ, and ε follow independent normal distributions. Hence the distribution





40Let’s deﬁne x = −V −1(d + eθ + fε)U
x ∼ N
¡
−V −1(d + eθ + fε)U,V−2(d + eθ + fε)2 ∗ ΣU
¢
y = exp(x) ∼ LogNormal
¡
−V −1(d + eθ + fε)U,V−2(d + eθ + fε)2 ∗ ΣU
¢
EU[y|θ,ε]} =e x p [ −V −1(d + eθ + fε)U + V −2(d + eθ + fε)2 ∗ ΣU
2 ]
EUI = −exp−W1
τ ∗ Eθ,εexp−V −1[(d + eθ + fε)(a + bθ + cε)+( d + eθ +
fε)U − V −1(d + eθ + fε)2 ∗ ΣU
2 ]
EUI = −exp(−W1
τ ) ∗ Eθ(exp−V −1[(d + eθ)(a + bθ)+( d + eθ)U − V −1(d +
eθ)2 ΣU
2 ]
∗Eε[exp−V −1(A + Bε)ε|θ])
Let A and B such that
A = α + βθ
Where
α = d + c + fa+ fU − V −1df ΣU
β = ec + fb− V −1efΣU
And
B = fc− V −1f2 ∗ ΣU/2
(A + Bε)ε = B(ε + A
2B)2 − A2
4B












We need B positive to apply Proposition 1
Eε(exp−V −1B(ε + A
2B)2)= 1




τ ) ∗ Eθ exp{−V −1(d + eθ)[(a + bθ)+U −
V −1(d + eθ)ΣU











∗Eθ exp{−V −1(Cθ+ Dθ
2)}
Where
C = db + ea + eU − V −1ΣUed − αβ V
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We use the derivation of the utility for informed and uninformed investors in
the autarky case to infer the utility Ei
I of the informed investor and Ei
UI of
uninformed investors in country i in the cross-listing case.
However, in the cross-listing case θ,P,ε, and U are 5 by 1 vectors instead of
scalars. The matrices ´ Mi (for i =0 ,1,2,3) are also 5 by 5 matrices. Besides,
the diﬀerence in dimension, in the cross-listing case investors have access to
several assets, and the 5 by 5 matrices Ni represent the assets each investor i
can invest in. Whereas, in the autarky case, there was a single asset and investor
could only invest in that one asset. Hence the 5 by 5 matrices P, Ai,A ,A v,
and Mi are as deﬁned in the model, and a,b,c are such that



















42We use the vector formulation of Proposition 1:
If a random vector X follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean
M and variance Σ, then, for any positive deﬁnite matrix α,
E(exp−X0αX)=( 2 αΣ + I)−1/2 exp−
n
M0 Σ−1
2 [I − (2αΣ + I)0−1]M
o
Where I is the identity matrix.
8.2.1 Informed investor i from country i
EI
i = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
The expression of EI
i can be written such that it
EI
i = −{A0
i(2I − ΣUAi)c0Σεc + A0











−1 [I − (A0
i(2I − ΣUAi)c0Σεc + I)0−1]b0Σθb + I)}0−1]
∗
¡
a + bθ +( 2 I − ΣUAi)−1U
¢
}
8.2.2 Uninformed investor i from country i
The expected utility of the uninformed investor in the cross-listing case can
be obtained the same way we derived the expected utility of the uninformed
investor in the autarky case. However, we need to take into account that all
the variables and parameters are matrices or vector, and we need to take into




UI = Eθ,ε,U (−exp(−W2/τ))
Let’s deﬁne
d = α1 − M0 − M1α1
e = α2 − M2 − M1α2
f = α3 − M3 − M1α3
Let’s also deﬁne










ε )Σε + I
¢0−1](2k + Σ−1
ε )−1
Let l and m, two linear functions of θ such that.
43l = l1 + l2θ









l2 = f0AVib + f0AVi
ΣU
2 AVie
m1 = d0AVic + d0AV 0
i ΣUAVif
m2 = e0AVic + e0AViΣUAVif
Let’s also deﬁne
n =[ d0AVia + dAViU − 1
2d0AV 0
i ΣUAVid]
o =[ e0AVia + e0AViU − 1
2e0AV 0
i ΣUAVid]
p =[ d0AVib − 1
2d0AV 0
i ΣUAVie]
q =[ e0AVib − 1
2e0AV 0
i ΣUAVie]
Let O =( o + m0
2Kl1)
P =( p + m0
1Kl2)
Q =( q + m0
2Kl2)
Then, ﬁnally,
EUI = −((2k + Σ−1
ε )Σε + I)−1/2((2Q + Σ
−1
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46Table 1. Parametrization of the Baseline Case of the Model
Parameters β






β1 = β2 =0 .5
Parameters µ,τ, and X









47Figure 1: Price Response of all Assets to Shocks to Asset 01
A. Negative Info Shock
Stock 0 Stock 01 Stock 02 Stock 1 Stock 2
Expectation Component 0.125 -0.607 -0.071 0.106 -0.044
Portfolio Balance 0.007 -0.021 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
Total 0.132 -0.628 -0.073 0.112 -0.046
B. Negative Liquidity Shock
Expectation Component 0.0776 -0.4236 0.0357 0.0473 -0.0085
Portfolio Balance -0.0087 -0.0178 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
Total 0.069 -0.441 0.035 0.047 -0.009
Panel A. presents the price response to a one standard deviation negative information 
shock to asset 01. Panel B. presents the price response to a one standard deviation 
negative liquidity shock to asset 01. 
48Figure 2: Price Response of all Assets to Shocks to Asset 1
A. Negative Info Shock
Stock 0 Stock 01 Stock 02 Stock 1 Stock 2
Expectation Component 0.081 0.109 -0.045 -0.419 -0.028
Portfolio Balance 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.023 -0.001
Total 0.083 0.111 -0.046 -0.442 -0.029
B. Negative Liquidity Shock
Expectation Component 0.0493 -0.0208 0.022 -0.4576 -0.0056
Portfolio Balance -0.0042 -0.002 -0.0002 -0.0262 -0.0003
Total 0.045 -0.023 0.022 -0.484 -0.006
Panel A. presents the price response to a one standard deviation negative information 
shock to the pure domestic asset 1. Panel B. presents the price response to a one 
standard deviation negative liquidity shock to asset 1. 
49Figure 3: Variance of Prices as a Function of Shocks
Stock 0 Stock 01 Stock 02 Stock 1 Stock 2
Shock to Stock 01 0.13 0.64 0.07 0.11 0.05
Shock to Stock 02 0.13 0.07 0.64 0.05 0.11
Shock to Stock 1 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.45 0.03
Shock to Stock 2 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.45
Total 0.43 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.64
Effect of Shocks on Stock 01 0.31 0.74 0.08 0.17 0.07
Effect of Shocks on Stock 02 0.31 0.08 0.74 0.07 0.17
Effect of Shocks on Stock 1 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.71 0.05
Effect of Shocks on Stock 2 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.71
The table presents the variance decomposition analysis for each asset as a function 
of the contributions of shocks from other assets.
50Figure 4: Price Response to Shocks to Asset 01 with no Asymmetric Information
in Country 0
A. Negative Info Shock
Stock 0 Stock 01 Stock 02 Stock 1 Stock 2
Expectation Component 0.157 -0.628 -0.091 0.093 -0.057
Portfolio Balance 0.000 -0.021 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
Total 0.157 -0.649 -0.093 0.099 -0.059
B. Negative Liquidity Shock
Expectation Component 0.1275 -0.4241 0.0352 0.0394 -0.0165
Portfolio Balance -0.0099 -0.0179 -0.0004 -0.0040 -0.0006
Total 0.118 -0.442 0.035 0.035 -0.017
The table considers the case, where all investors are uninformed in the developed 
market. However, information remains asymmetric among investors in emerging 
countries. 
Figure 5: Price Response to Shocks from Asset 01 as a function of Va r(θ02)
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51Figure 6: Price Response to Shocks from Asset 01 as a function of β02
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Figure 7: Price Response to Shocks from Asset 01 as a function of Va r(η02)
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52Figure 8: Welfare Analysis: Change in Consumption Level from Autarky to
Cross-listing
A. Informed investors




The table presents the changes in the second period wealth necessary for each type 
of investor in each country to move from the level of utility associated with autarky to 
the utility level associated with cross-listing. 
Figure 9: Sample Regression Coeﬃcients before the Brazilian Crisis
αβ Vres
U.S.
Stock 0 0.0015 -0.0536 0.0001
Brazil
Stock 01 -0.0017 0.3992 0.0007
Stock 1 -0.0014 0.4343 0.0006
Chile
Stock 02 -0.0015 0.6101 0.0001
Stock 2 -0.0012 0.2575 0.0001
Mexico
Stock 02 -0.0035 1.1660 0.0003
Stock 2 -0.0023 0.2860 0.0002
The table presents the result of the regression  R=α+β*fworld+Res   of returns 
of the international (domestic)  index of a country on the global factor, fworld, 
during the period prior to the Brazilian crisis, defined from 1/14/1994 to 
10/22/1998. 
53Figure 10: Price Response in Chile and Mexico to Information Shocks from
Brazil
A. CHILE
Stock 0 Stock 01  Stock 02 Stock 1 Stock 2
(98,1,1) 0 -0.991 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0001
(1,98,1) 0 -1 0 0 0
(1,1,98) 0 -1 0 0 0
(60,0.1,39.9) 0 -0.9718 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0002
(39.9,0.1,60) 0 -0.9867 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001
B. MEXICO
(98,1,1) 0 -0.991 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0001
(1,98,1) 0 -1 0 0 0
(1,1,98) 0 -1 0 0 0
(60,0.1,39.9) 0 -0.9718 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0004
(39.9,0.1,60) 0 -0.9867 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0002
(x, y,z) represents a scenario where the variance of the liquidity shock, the variance of the 
information shock, and the variance of the country specific shock respectively represent x%, 
y%, and z% of the total variance of residuals.
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